No. 89-989

Supreme Court, U.S.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1989

CITY OF NORFOLK, VIRGINIA, *et al.*,
Petitioners,

v.

HERBERT M. COLLINS, *et al.*,
Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit

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RESPONSE OF PETITIONERS TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S AMICUS BRIEF

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RESPONSE OF PETITIONERS TO THE SOLICITOR GENERAL'S AMICUS BRIEF

Compelling arguments for granting this writ are to be found in the Solicitor General's brief. The United States acknowledges that the issues raised by Petitioners are "serious" (U.S. Amicus Br. 7) and that "the court of appeals' analysis is not without flaws." *Id.* at 7-8. Specifically, the Solicitor General agreed that the court of appeals "artificially narrowed its focus to contests for a second seat" (*id.* at 10); that its "analysis of the 'totality of circumstances' . . . was incomplete" (*ibid.*); that its reasoning was "flaw[ed]" in discounting white candidates with majority black support (Mrs. Howell and Mr. Staylor) as successful candidates for a second seat (*id.* at 12); that its presumption against the inclusion of can-

didates receiving majority black support "makes little sense" and rests on an "incorrect" assumption that "minority voters may have only one defeated candidate of choice in a multiple seat election" (*id.* at 13 n.1); and that it is "plausible that blacks now enjoy an opportunity to elect a second representative of their choice to the council" and that the court of appeals "should not have substituted its judgment for that of the district court on that issue." *Id.* at 16.

Despite the numerous legal errors that the Solicitor General discerns in the majority opinion of the court of appeals, it was "unclear" to the United States that such errors necessarily made any difference in the Fourth Circuit's reversal of the District Court. Notwithstanding the District Court's findings that most black-supported candidates have usually won over two decades, most *black* black-supported candidates have usually won, and that for a decade prior to 1984, the black community had on council *two*, proportional seats consistently filled by black-supported candidates, the Solicitor General focused solely upon the opportunity of the black community to fill a second seat with a *black* representative. Although agree that Mrs. Howell and Mr. Staylor were candidates of choice of the black community who successfully filled a "second seat" and/or "third seat" between 1974 and 1984, the United States points to four black candidates between 1970 and 1982 who received majority black support, notes that these candidates received less white votes than black candidates for the "first seat" and states "petitioners have pointed to nothing in the record about the characteristics of the second-seat candidates or the circumstances of these elections that adequately explains this white voting behavior, leaving the opposition of whites to a second black representative as the most persuasive explanation." U.S. Amicus Br. 10.

The United States' analysis is legally flawed and focuses on the wrong inquiry. If, as the United States

agrees, Mrs. Howell and Mr. Staylor were clear candidates of choice of the black community for a "second seat", receiving high black support and black organizational endorsements, and defeating black candidates among black voters, then to find a violation because a *black* candidate did not fill a "second seat" does, in effect, make the race of the candidate not only a relevant, but a determinative factor in the analysis of election of candidates of choice. This position is at odds with the position taken in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30, 67 (1986), and with those courts of appeals which recognize that the race of the candidate is either irrelevant (*City of Carrolton Branch of NAACP v. Stallings*, 829 F.2d 1547, 1557-58 (11th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 108 S.Ct. 1111 (1988)), or relevant only to the question of whether to consider elections in which minority candidates do not run.[1] It raises the important question of whether a Section 2 challenge can ever be defeated unless *all* seats equal to the number of minority districts which could be created are filled by candidates of the same race.

Even if the proper focus were the opportunity to elect a second *black* candidate, the Solicitor General was wrong in ignoring those factors whose presence demonstrate that loss in particular elections is not due to a structural infirmity that lessens opportunity. Consider the following:

(1) The Solicitor General failed to take into account the closeness of the elections. Of the four instances cited by the United States of losses by black candidates in 1970 through 1982 for a "second seat," two of the races (Mr.

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[1] *See Campos v. City of Baytown*, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988), *cert. denied*, 109 S.Ct. 3213 (1989); *Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, La.*, 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987), *cert. denied*, 109 S.Ct. 3213 (1989); *Sanchez v. Bond*, 875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989), *cert. pending*, No. 89-353.

Walton's in 1970 and Mrs. Butts' in 1980) were extremely close.[2]

(2) The Solicitor General failed to take into account the role of endorsements. Without black organizational endorsement, white candidate Howell would not have defeated Mrs. Butts in 1980.[3]

(3) The Solicitor General failed to take into account other candidates in the field. In 1982, Mrs. Butts lost votes, both black and white, because two additional black candidates (Gay and Collins) ran on a Democratic Party ticket, and who, although not receiving Concerned Citizen endorsement and not receiving a majority of black votes, nevertheless drew off needed votes from Mrs. Butts. Tr. 1978; Pet. App. 209a. Mrs. Butts still came in fifth for four seats out of a fourteen candidate field.[4]

(4) The Solicitor General failed to take into account the role of name recognition. As Dr. Timothy O'Rourke testified, when Mrs. Butts' familiarity city-wide increased

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[2] Mr. Walton running for one of six seats in 1970 lost by only 920 votes out of a turnout of 30,595. Pet. App. 215a. He ran in a field of nineteen candidates of whom four were incumbents, and all four won. In 1980, Mrs. Butts ran against eleven other candidates, including two incumbents for one of three seats, but lost by only 405 votes out of 28,638 ballots cast, coming in fourth, as the district court found. Pet. App. 68a, 210a. *See Sanchez v. Bond*, 875 F.2d at 1492-93, in which the Tenth Circuit's affirmance was based in part on close races in which Hispanics ran but lost as well as on the election of Anglo candidates preferred by Hispanics, points noted by the United States in its Amicus brief, at 15, in *Sanchez*.

[3] In 1980, the Concerned Citizens supported both Mrs. Howell and Mrs. Butts, and with that endorsement, Mrs. Howell received 72.9% of the black vote, and only 31.7% of the white vote. As undisputed testimony showed, without the black support, Mrs. Howell would have lost and Mrs. Butts would have won. Pet. App. 210a; Tr. 1977.

[4] In that same election, black candidate Joseph Green won more votes city-wide than any other candidate, black or white.

so did her white support. Tr. 1978-1979; Def.Ex. 476. With each election from 1980 through 1984, her percentage of white votes increased, and by 1984, Mrs. Butts had become a city-wide candidate whose vote distribution was almost identical to successful "first seat" black candidates Joseph Jordan and Joseph Green. Def. Ex. 476.[5]

Precisely because political opportunity can be disclosed only in the context of elections and not simply by the win/loss column, the Voting Rights Act, as this Court has emphasized, requires a "searching practical evaluation of the past and present reality." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 45-46. By looking only to the losses by *black* candidates for a "second seat" without considering the context of those elections or considering the enormous success of minority-supported candidates overall, both black and white, the Fourth Circuit thwarted the proper application of the "totality of circumstances" analysis in determining electoral success. Certainly, the District Court was entitled to rely upon the circumstances discussed above when considering the "totality of circumstances" which demonstrated that not only do black voters have the opportunity to elect a *second* candidate of choice, but a *black* second candidate of choice. This conclusion is only reinforced further by the success of black voters in maintaining two seats on council filled by *black* candidates, from *1984*, and with the recent re-election of Joseph Green, through at least *1992*.[6]

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[5] Her percentage of white votes was almost identical to successful black candidate John Foster who was supported by the mayor, and as the undisputed testimony disclosed, had her *black* support not dropped in 1984, she would have become the third black member of council, as the district court found. Pet. App. 70a; 154a. She received more white votes in 1984 than six other candidates. Pet. App. 208a; Tr. 1978. Mrs. Butts was a principal witness for Petitioners at trial, supporting Norfolk's at-large system. Pet. App. 181a; Tr. 1632.

[6] This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that on May 1, 1990, Joseph Green was re-elected to a four year term, receiving

In addition to the errors committed by the Fourth Circuit with regard to determining the ability of the black community to elect candidates of choice prior to 1984, the United States recognized that the Fourth Circuit also erred in its analysis of the election of a second black member to City Council in 1984 and the consistent re-election of black incumbents thereafter. U.S. Amicus Br. 15-16. The errors, according to the Solicitor General, were caused by the misapplication of the "clearly erroneous" standard under Rule 52(a), are "unlikely to have any significance beyond this case" and do not "warrant this Court's review." *Ibid.*

These errors, however, go beyond the Fourth Circuit's interpretation of the facts. In the instance of the 1984 election, the court of appeals held that the proper legal focus was *solely* upon the white support given to *black* candidates for a *second seat*, rather than all minority-supported candidates, which, as discussed above, makes the race of the candidate the determinative factor as well as improperly narrowing the focus to a second seat. Although the Solicitor General endorsed the Fourth Circuit's approach with regard to 1984 (*id.* at 15), this position is in complete contradiction to the measure the Solicitor General earlier applied to determine the opportunity to elect a second black council member between 1970 and 1982, namely, the support white voters gave the *first* seat black candidates. *Id.* at 10. The result, of course, is the creation of confusing double standards in the determination of equal opportunity.

With regard to the 1986 and 1988 elections, the Fourth Circuit treated the presence of black incumbents as a "special circumstance" without attempting to analyze, as the District Court did (App. 80a), whether or not in-

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the second highest vote total city-wide of fourteen candidates for four seats. See official election returns in the appendix to this brief. Councilman John Foster, re-elected in 1988, does not stand for re-election until 1992.

cumbency lessened minority opportunity to elect. Presumably, the re-election of Joseph Green in May, 1990, suffers from the same fatal flaw. Thus, the result is to turn a factor such as incumbency, which conceivably could be but certainly is not necessarily a "special circumstance", into one that *automatically* eliminates minority victories. This cannot be so. This is an important legal issue which should be addressed by this Court.

Were these errors of the Fourth Circuit *only* caused by the misapplication of Rule 52(a), review by this Court still would be warranted. If, as the United States believes, most voting rights cases are "fact-intensive" and there is "persistent confusion and division in the circuits" even as to "application of governing principles to particular facts" (*id.* at 8) then the ability of a court of appeals to simply substitute its judgment for that of a district court will only exacerbate the confusion.[7] The unchecked usurpation of the district court's fact-finding role only serves to undermine "the application of the clearly-erroneous standard to ultimate findings of vote dilution [which] preserves the benefit of the trial court's particular familiarity with the indigenous political reality without endangering the rule of law." *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 79.[8]

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[7] In its Amicus brief in *Sanchez v. Bond*, No. 89-353, the United States recommended against certiorari because there were no discerned legal errors and because the Tenth Circuit's affirmance was governed by the "clearly erroneous" standard. U.S. Amicus Br. in *Sanchez v. Bond*, 8. Here, the United States agrees that the Fourth Circuit committed legal errors *and* failed to abide by the "clearly erroneous" standard, and yet, because the issues are "fact-bound" believes it is "unlikely to have any significance beyond this case." Under that analysis, this Court should not have granted certiorari in *Thornburg v. Gingles*, 478 U.S. 30 (1986), another "fact-bound" case.

[8] This Court has never hesitated to correct a court of appeals which has overstepped its bounds under the "clearly erroneous"

In the absence of review, the incorrect legal standards applied by the Fourth Circuit remain uncorrected, only adding to confusion in the circuits. Indeed, the Solicitor General recognized that he "would be remiss in failing to note that, as a general matter, the courts of appeals appear to be experiencing considerable difficulty in resolving a wide range of issues surrounding application of Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act to at-large election systems." U.S. Amicus Br. 8. It is certainly no accident that apart from the Fourth Circuit, two others—the Eighth and the Eleventh—have recently divided evenly *en banc* on the proper interpretation of Section 2. *See Solomon v. Liberty County*, No. 87-3406 (11th Cir. April 5, 1990); *Whitfield v. Democratic Party*, No. 88-1953 (8th Cir. May 4, 1990). In the case of the Eleventh Circuit, the precise issue dividing the Court was the extent to which Voting Rights Act defendants may rebut in a challenge to an at-large system a plaintiff's demonstration of the three threshold preconditions under *Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 50-51, with evidence concerning the other Senate Report factors. That division in *Solomon* resulted in a remand to the district court with no guidance as to how to proceed.* The relationship between the three preconditions and the "totality of circumstances" test is raised directly by this case (*see*

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standard, *see Anderson v. City of Bessemer*, 470 U.S. 564 (1985), and in an area of the law where all facts must be carefully analyzed to protect important political rights, adherence to this rule is of critical significance.

* The *per curiam* opinion notes that while "the appellants have satisfied the three *Gingles* factors . . . we are divided on the legal effect of proving these factors. Because we are divided in our interpretation of *Gingles* and Section 2 . . . we do not specifically direct the district court on how to proceed on remand. Rather, we instruct the district court to proceed in accordance with *Gingles*, giving due consideration to the views expressed by Chief Judge Tjoflat's and Judge Kravitch's specially concurring opinions." 1990 WestLaw 42135, at 4.

Pet. 28) and upon a fully developed record which presents an opportunity to resolve this and other important issues under Section 2.

On the eve of a new wave of challenges to at-large election systems based on the 1990 Census, guidance from this Court *now* is crucial on the issues of who counts as a candidate of choice in determining legally significant polarized voting and proportional representation, the relationship between legally significant polarized voting and proportional representation, how far an appellate court may go to supplant a district court's analysis of special circumstances and what is the role of the Senate Report factors in the "totality of circumstances."

No other at-large electoral system has ever been before this Court in which a district court has so completely documented the level of minority electoral success found in Norfolk and dispelled every indicium of unequal opportunity only to have a court of appeals, through use of improper legal standards, find a Section 2 violation. In the absence of review, this case will stand for the proposition that notwithstanding usual success overall by black-supported candidates over time, usual success in filling seats equal to the number of likely minority districts and minority proportion of the population, and lack of any other factors thwarting equality of opportunity, an at-large system still is violative of Section 2. In no other reported case have *all* of the Senate Report factors been found in favor of the governing body. These are the "circumstances" that "justify a finding of no violation." U.S. Amicus Br. 17. If Norfolk's electoral system cannot withstand a Section 2 challenge, few, if any, at-large systems can and the recognition by this Court that at-large systems are not *per se* illegal, *see Gingles*, 478 U.S. at 46, becomes, as a practical matter, meaningless.

Respectfully submitted,

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APPENDIX

APPENDIX

The attached five (5) city Council Election Results Sheets for the City of Norfolk is a true copy of the official results of the election held on May 1, 1990.

/s/ Betty W. Edwards
Chief Assistant Registrar

STATE OF VIRGINIA

CITY OF NORFOLK, to-wit:

I, Sandra B. Claxton, a Notary Public of the State of Virginia in and for the City aforesaid, do hereby certify that Betty W. Edwards, Chief Assistant Registrar, whose name is signed above, has acknowledged the same before me in my City and State aforesaid.

Given under my hand this 29th day of May, 1990.

/s/ Sandra B. Claxton
Notary Public

My commission expires: April 28, 1992

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF NORFOLK

GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1990

NUMBER PRECINCT	ANDREWS	CARR	COFIELD	DOWNING	DRIVER	FRAIM	GREEN	JOHNSON	JONES	LANGHORNE	MARSHALL	PHILLIPS	ROBINSON	WASHINGTON
01	98	4	11	287	5	70	282	8	16	7	8	90	9	111
	27.22%	1.11%	3.06%	79.72%	1.39%	19.44%	78.33%	2.22%	4.44%	1.94%	2.22%	25.00%	2.50%	30.83%
02	82	3	8	382	7	58	213	4	10	7	6	89	16	175
	18.59%	0.68%	1.81%	86.62%	1.59%	13.15%	48.30%	0.91%	2.27%	1.59%	1.36%	20.18%	3.63%	39.68%
03	86	3	9	92	6	68	160	3	4	43	8	60	15	118
	41.55%	1.45%	4.35%	44.44%	2.90%	32.85%	77.29%	1.45%	1.93%	20.77%	3.86%	28.99%	7.25%	57.00%
04	294	10	20	203	12	235	384	17	9	1	16	121	22	59
	63.91%	2.17%	4.35%	44.13%	2.61%	51.09%	83.48%	3.70%	1.96%	0.22%	3.48%	26.30%	4.78%	12.83%
05	78	2	2	72	0	59	107	1	3	1	7	49	4	10
	65.55%	1.68%	1.68%	60.50%		49.58%	89.92%	0.84%	2.52%	0.84%	5.88%	41.18%	3.36%	8.40%
06	143	3	5	114	3	126	178	8	6	1	7	65	1	30
	68.75%	1.44%	2.40%	54.81%	1.44%	60.58%	85.58%	3.85%	2.88%	0.48%	3.37%	31.25%	0.48%	14.42%
07	106	5	5	116	4	79	162	5	4	4	9	85	16	39
	49.53%	2.34%	2.34%	54.21%	1.87%	36.92%	75.70%	2.34%	1.87%	1.87%	4.21%	39.72%	7.48%	18.22%
08	222	4	5	160	8	191	298	10	4	2	7	90	7	34
	63.25%	1.14%	1.42%	45.58%	2.28%	54.42%	84.90%	2.85%	1.14%	0.57%	1.99%	25.64%	1.99%	9.69%
09	58	1	4	65	6	51	96	3	0	0	6	45	6	10
	44.62%	0.77%	3.08%	50.00%	4.62%	39.23%	73.85%	2.31%			4.62%	34.62%	4.62%	7.69%
10	216	5	2	19	15	197	188	3	3	1	25	191	12	13
	81.51%	1.89%	0.75%	7.17%	5.66%	74.34%	70.94%	1.13%	1.13%	0.38%	9.43%	72.08%	4.53%	4.91%
11	241	7	7	20	10	234	216	8	3	5	29	215	15	16
	83.10%	2.41%	2.41%	6.90%	3.45%	80.69%	74.48%	2.76%	1.03%	1.72%	10.00%	74.14%	5.17%	5.52%
12	451	11	16	28	27	433	408	16	3	8	85	390	27	48
	81.70%	1.99%	2.90%	5.07%	4.89%	78.44%	73.91%	2.90%	0.54%	1.45%	15.40%	70.65%	4.89%	8.70%
13	262	2	15	23	15	233	227	9	3	4	45	224	14	22
	85.34%	0.65%	4.89%	7.49%	4.89%	75.90%	73.94%	2.93%	0.98%	1.30%	14.66%	72.96%	4.56%	7.17%

OFFICIAL RESULTS

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF NORFOLK

GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1990

NUMBER PRECINCT	ANDREWS	CARR	COFIELD	DOWNING	DRIVER	FRAIM	GREEN	JOHNSON	JONES	LANGHORNE	MARSHALL	PHILLIPS	ROBINSON	WASHINGTON
14	176	4	6	84	4	154	211	3	3	5	10	88	11	16
	71.84%	1.63%	2.45%	34.29%	1.63%	62.86%	86.12%	1.22%	1.22%	2.04%	4.08%	35.92%	4.49%	6.53%
15	246	16	18	99	18	215	261	24	7	8	52	219	18	37
	68.72%	4.47%	5.03%	27.65%	5.03%	60.06%	72.91%	6.70%	1.96%	2.23%	14.53%	61.17%	5.03%	10.34%
16	155	9	7	37	11	146	187	12	9	2	28	135	15	28
	65.13%	3.78%	2.94%	15.55%	4.62%	61.34%	78.57%	5.04%	3.78%	0.84%	11.76%	56.72%	6.30%	11.76%
17	67	0	8	88	7	73	102	5	1	0	7	29	4	20
	52.76%		6.30%	69.29%	5.51%	57.48%	80.31%	3.94%	0.79%		5.51%	22.83%	3.15%	15.75%
18	397	3	6	26	16	361	324	8	3	4	39	374	16	15
	86.68%	0.66%	1.31%	5.68%	3.49%	78.82%	70.74%	1.75%	0.66%	0.87%	8.52%	81.66%	3.49%	3.28%
19	293	4	7	21	9	287	253	8	3	4	26	266	9	20
	83.24%	1.14%	1.99%	5.97%	2.56%	81.53%	71.88%	2.27%	0.85%	1.14%	7.39%	75.57%	2.56%	5.68%
20	406	8	11	29	30	378	339	11	3	5	55	371	23	25
	83.71%	1.65%	2.27%	5.98%	6.19%	77.94%	69.90%	2.27%	0.62%	1.03%	11.34%	76.49%	4.74%	5.15%
21	586	9	14	42	44	559	480	9	6	4	60	554	26	26
	83.24%	1.28%	1.99%	5.97%	6.25%	79.40%	68.18%	1.28%	0.85%	0.57%	8.52%	78.69%	3.69%	3.69%
22	294	12	19	39	35	269	255	19	9	15	50	262	19	20
	75.19%	3.07%	4.86%	9.97%	8.95%	68.80%	65.22%	4.86%	2.30%	3.84%	12.79%	67.01%	4.86%	5.12%
23	396	5	13	49	28	372	327	18	9	9	56	323	24	30
	84.62%	1.07%	2.78%	10.47%	5.98%	79.49%	69.87%	3.85%	1.92%	1.92%	11.97%	69.02%	5.13%	6.41%
24	361	9	17	47	38	320	303	14	14	4	90	398	35	31
	67.23%	1.68%	3.17%	8.75%	7.08%	59.59%	56.42%	2.61%	2.61%	0.74%	16.76%	74.12%	6.52%	5.77%
26	441	9	24	99	49	408	419	25	19	11	50	412	17	39
	73.87%	1.51%	4.02%	16.58%	8.21%	68.34%	70.18%	4.19%	3.18%	1.84%	8.38%	69.01%	2.85%	6.53%
27	195	1	14	25	25	185	169	14	6	3	32	184	14	27
	76.77%	0.39%	5.51%	9.84%	9.84%	72.83%	66.54%	5.51%	2.36%	1.18%	12.60%	72.44%	5.51%	10.63%

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF NORFOLK

GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1990

NUMBER PRECINCT	ANDREWS	CARR	COFIELD	DOWNING	DRIVER	FRAIM	GREEN	JOHNSON	JONES	LANGHORNE	MARSHALL	PHILLIPS	ROBINSON	WASHINGTON
28	169	10	11	35	20	144	155	22	10	4	34	138	19	18
	69.55%	4.12%	4.53%	14.40%	8.23%	59.26%	63.79%	9.05%	4.12%	1.65%	13.99%	56.79%	7.82%	7.41%
29	114	8	4	81	11	95	132	12	4	7	21	99	21	26
	56.72%	3.98%	1.99%	40.30%	5.47%	47.26%	65.67%	5.97%	1.99%	3.48%	10.45%	49.25%	10.45%	12.94%
30	273	9	20	98	28	230	316	16	14	13	49	248	38	43
	66.26%	2.18%	4.85%	23.79%	6.80%	55.83%	76.70%	3.88%	3.40%	3.16%	11.89%	60.19%	9.22%	10.44%
31	296	14	12	87	29	275	307	14	9	6	38	216	21	31
	70.31%	3.33%	2.85%	20.67%	6.89%	65.32%	72.92%	3.33%	2.14%	1.43%	9.03%	51.31%	4.99%	7.36%
32	231	2	7	46	33	196	182	14	5	4	69	230	23	24
	72.19%	0.63%	2.19%	14.38%	10.31%	61.25%	56.88%	4.38%	1.56%	1.25%	21.56%	71.88%	7.19%	7.50%
33	194	11	13	35	35	180	148	8	7	7	76	221	28	27
	68.07%	3.86%	4.56%	12.28%	12.28%	63.16%	51.93%	2.81%	2.46%	2.46%	26.67%	77.54%	9.82%	9.47%
34	85	6	5	17	23	75	69	6	6	5	43	94	23	19
	61.15%	4.32%	3.60%	12.23%	16.55%	53.96%	49.64%	4.32%	4.32%	3.60%	30.94%	67.63%	16.55%	13.67%
35	120	7	3	15	16	105	101	8	3	5	31	124	8	15
	72.29%	4.22%	1.81%	9.04%	9.64%	63.25%	60.84%	4.82%	1.81%	3.01%	18.67%	74.70%	4.82%	9.04%
36	95	9	13	14	18	68	74	15	5	13	30	104	26	23
	66.43%	6.29%	9.09%	9.79%	12.59%	47.55%	51.75%	10.49%	3.50%	9.09%	20.98%	72.73%	18.18%	16.08%
37	133	8	10	28	17	117	112	10	7	8	35	157	18	11
	65.84%	3.96%	4.95%	13.86%	8.42%	57.92%	55.45%	4.95%	3.47%	3.96%	17.33%	77.72%	8.91%	5.45%
38	135	11	12	16	37	118	112	11	8	6	50	149	28	18
	63.98%	5.21%	5.69%	7.58%	17.54%	55.92%	53.08%	5.21%	3.79%	2.84%	23.70%	70.62%	13.27%	8.53%
39	245	15	44	71	59	220	219	22	15	7	66	268	36	38
	60.49%	3.70%	10.86%	17.53%	14.57%	54.32%	54.07%	5.43%	3.70%	1.73%	16.30%	66.17%	8.89%	9.38%
40	254	12	23	44	60	229	221	15	12	6	65	289	23	43
	64.47%	3.05%	5.84%	11.17%	15.23%	58.12%	56.09%	3.81%	3.05%	1.52%	16.50%	73.35%	5.84%	10.91%

OFFICIAL RESULTS

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF NORFOLK

GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1990

NUMBER PRECINCT	ANDREWS	CARR	COFIELD	DOWNING	DRIVER	FRAIM	GREEN	JOHNSON	JONES	LANGHORNE	MARSHALL	PHILLIPS	ROBINSON	WASHINGTON
41	202	5	10	16	38	200	162	3	3	5	39	219	16	13
	73.99%	1.83%	3.66%	5.86%	13.92%	73.26%	59.34%	1.10%	1.10%	1.83%	14.29%	80.22%	5.86%	4.76%
42	235	6	21	238	4	203	394	14	13	15	17	214	15	41
	46.44%	1.19%	4.15%	47.04%	0.79%	40.12%	77.87%	2.77%	2.57%	2.96%	3.36%	42.29%	2.96%	8.10%
43	61	4	6	9	25	64	55	0	3	4	27	74	8	7
	62.24%	4.08%	6.12%	9.18%	25.51%	65.31%	56.12%		3.06%	4.08%	27.55%	75.51%	8.16%	7.14%
44	184	16	14	28	67	153	128	17	12	6	67	194	22	32
	67.15%	5.84%	5.11%	10.22%	24.45%	55.84%	46.72%	6.20%	4.38%	2.19%	24.45%	70.80%	8.03%	11.68%
45	79	0	4	7	28	69	59	4	2	0	21	81	8	7
	75.24%		3.81%	6.67%	26.67%	65.71%	56.19%	3.81%	1.90%		20.00%	77.14%	7.62%	6.67%
46	310	12	18	29	84	302	231	13	6	8	100	346	32	24
	68.13%	2.64%	3.96%	6.37%	18.46%	66.37%	50.77%	2.86%	1.32%	1.76%	21.98%	76.04%	7.03%	5.27%
47	329	9	22	43	53	315	286	25	8	12	72	321	28	40
	72.63%	1.99%	4.86%	9.49%	11.70%	69.54%	63.13%	5.52%	1.77%	2.65%	15.89%	70.86%	6.18%	8.83%
48	138	12	9	21	36	135	100	9	5	7	56	172	25	18
	62.16%	5.41%	4.05%	9.46%	16.22%	60.81%	45.05%	4.05%	2.25%	3.15%	25.23%	77.48%	11.26%	8.11%
49	67	1	5	16	38	70	63	3	5	4	29	85	12	15
	56.78%	0.85%	4.24%	13.56%	32.20%	59.32%	53.39%	2.54%	4.24%	3.39%	24.58%	72.03%	10.17%	12.71%
50	426	26	45	78	301	414	292	34	30	16	187	513	69	52
	55.40%	3.38%	5.85%	10.14%	39.14%	53.84%	37.97%	4.42%	3.90%	2.08%	24.32%	66.71%	8.97%	6.76%
51	240	10	19	37	143	214	175	25	12	11	95	275	50	39
	60.76%	2.53%	4.81%	9.37%	36.20%	54.18%	44.30%	6.33%	3.04%	2.78%	24.05%	69.62%	12.66%	9.87%
52	321	16	23	34	117	308	224	17	11	9	95	342	47	21
	68.30%	3.40%	4.89%	7.23%	24.89%	65.53%	47.66%	3.62%	2.34%	1.91%	20.21%	72.77%	10.00%	4.47%
53	157	16	13	25	103	143	105	14	6	8	72	156	30	27
	62.80%	6.40%	5.20%	10.00%	41.20%	57.20%	42.00%	5.60%	2.40%	3.20%	28.80%	62.40%	12.00%	10.80%

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
CITY OF NORFOLK

GENERAL ELECTION
TUESDAY, MAY 1, 1990

NUMBER PRECINCT	ANDREWS	CARR	COFIELD	DOWNING	DRIVER	FRAIM	GREEN	JOHNSON	JONES	LANGHORNE	MARSHALL	PHILLIPS	ROBINSON	WASHINGTON
54	159	3	8	23	79	170	132	4	3	5	54	170	18	20
	62.11%	1.17%	3.13%	8.98%	30.86%	66.41%	51.56%	1.56%	1.17%	1.95%	21.09%	66.41%	7.03%	7.81%
55	204	17	21	45	150	196	162	15	12	9	86	215	43	34
	54.99%	4.58%	5.66%	12.13%	40.43%	52.83%	43.67%	4.04%	3.23%	2.43%	23.18%	57.95%	11.59%	9.16%
56	132	3	6	94	27	102	150	6	1	2	22	136	13	15
(ABSENTEE VOTERS)	52.80%	1.20%	2.40%	37.60%	10.80%	40.80%	60.00%	2.40%	0.40%	0.80%	8.80%	54.40%	5.20%	6.00%
TOTAL	11938	427	694	3596	2111	10871	11415	641	397	370	2459	11179	1143	1760
% OF RACE	66.60%	2.38%	3.87%	20.06%	11.78%	60.65%	63.68%	3.58%	2.21%	2.06%	13.72%	62.37%	6.38%	9.82%
% OF REG. VOTERS	13.67%	0.49%	0.79%	4.12%	2.42%	12.45%	13.07%	0.73%	0.45%	0.42%	2.82%	12.80%	1.31%	2.02%

CURRENTLY 55 PRECINCTS HAVE REPORTED OUT OF 55 TOTAL PRECINCTS (THERE IS NO PRECINCT # 25)
100.00% OF THE PRECINCTS HAVE REPORTED.